Abstract. We propose a market solution to the problem of resource allocation subject to quantitative constraints, such as those imposed by considerations of diversity or geographical distribution. Constraints are "priced," and agents are charged to the extent that their purchases affect the value (at equilibrium prices) of the relevant constraints. The result is a constrained-efficient market equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair whenever the constraints do not single out individual agents, which happens, for example with geographical distribution constraints. In economies with endowments, moreover, our equilibrium outcomes are constrained efficient and approximately individually rational.
Introduction
We propose a market mechanism for resource allocation under quantitative constraints. The constraints can be quite general, and capture generalized forms of upper and lower quotas. For example, imagine allocating school seats among students subject to diversity constraints; or hospital positions to doctors when there are geographical restrictions; or allocating courses among students when all students have to satisfy some minimal competency requirements. In addition to discussing practical examples of allocation problems with constraints, we show how our model can be used to capture the well-known roommate model of pairwise partnership formation, as well as more general models of group formation.
Given a set of constraints on allocations, and under standard continuity and convexity assumptions, our market mechanism achieves in equilibrium a (constrained) efficient outcome. Moreover, when constraints do not single out any particular agent, the equilibrium is efficient and fair; and when agents start out with property rights over initial endowments, we can achieve efficiency and approximate individual rationality.
The key idea in our proposal is to price constraints. Imagine for example an agent A who buys good l when there is a constraint on how many units of good l can go to a group of agents that includes A. Then the price that A pays for l will reflect, in part, the effect that A's action has on that constraint.
The idea is perhaps familiar from the role of shadow prices in optimization with constraints, but the familiarity is deceptive. Imagine using the dual variables (or Lagrange multipliers) associated with each constraint in order to decentralize an allocation that is constrained optimal. We run into two issues. One is that some constraints may impose a lower bound on consumed quantities, which would lead to negative prices. The other is that decentralizing a constrained optimal allocation would require transfers, as in the second welfare theorem. With transfers there is little hope to achieve an outcome that is fair, or individually rational. Our approach avoids these issues. We simplify the problem by working with a subset of the constraints, and ensure that these have positive prices. Individual rationality can be ensured when agents have endowments. And, as long as the constraints do not themselves induce unfairness by treating agents differently, it is possible to obtain a fair outcome in equilibrium.
We present a general result on the existence of a market equilibrium with the desirable properties, and develop several applications. The main application is to the model of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , who propose a fair and efficient competitive equilibrium solution to the problem of allocating indivisible goods. Our result delivers a constrained version of Hylland-Zeckhauser's equilibrium, where 1) each agent gets a fixed exogenous budget and chooses an optimal probabilistic assignment given equilibrium prices, 2) markets clear, and 3) the resulting allocation satisfies the desired constraints. This notion of equilibrium is constrained efficient.
A second application is to the roommates problem, which is usually presented as an example in which there is no stable matching. We consider the problem as one of resource allocation with constraints, and show that a market for roommates will have an equilibrium of the kind we have described -a "Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium" in the market for roommates. Our results imply the existence of an outcome that is stable in the sense that no individual agent wishes to deviate from the partnerships that they buy into at market prices.
Our third application concerns economies with endowments. As the result of some pre-existing initial allocation, each agent is endowed with some goods. The initial allocation satisfies the desired constraints. Our main result implies the existence of an equilibrium where agents' incomes are not exogenous, and are instead partially obtained in Walrasian fashion from agents' selling their endowments at equilibrium prices. Full Walrasian equilibrium may not exist, but it is still possible to let part of an agent's income be endogenous. As a consequence we can achieve an outcome that is approximately individually rational.
Related literature. Constrained resource allocation has received a lot of attention in recent years. The work by Kojima, Sun, and Yu (2018) , Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang (2019) and ours seems to be the first to look at constrained allocation by way of a market mechanism. Kojima et al, and Gul et al, study the role of gross substitutes in a general model of discrete allocation. Despite a similar focus on markets and constraints, the results in our papers are very different; see Section 7 for more details. In studying constraints, we are motivated by the early work of Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014) and Kamada and Kojima (2015) .
Our results apply to the same kind of constraints that they consider, but we differ substantially in methodology.
Aside from how we deal with constraints, our approach to income from endowments is closely related to, but distinct from, Mas-Colell (1992) , Le (2017), and McLennan (2018) . We provide a detailed comparison to in Section 7, as the differences and similarities with our work can best be appreciated after presenting our results.
The model
2.1. Notational conventions. For vectors x, y ∈ R n , x ≤ y means that x i ≤ y i for all i = 1, . . . , n; x < y means that x ≤ y and x = y; and x ≪ y means that x i < y i for all i = 1, . . . , n. The set of all x ∈ R n with 0 ≤ x is denoted by R n + , and the set of all x ∈ R n with 0 ≪ x is denoted by R n ++ . Inner products are denoted as
} is a convex set, for all x ∈ X.
• semi-strictly quasi-concave if it is quasi-concave, and for any x, z ∈ X, u(z) = u(x) and λ ∈ (0, 1) imply that
• concave if, for any x, z ∈ X, and λ ∈ (0, 1), λu(z)
• expected utility if there exists a vector v ∈ R n with u(x) = v · x for all x ∈ X.
• C 1 if it can be extended to a continuously differentiable function defined on an open set that contains X.
• strictly monotone if
Given a set A ⊆ R n , let co(A) denote the convex hull of A in R n : the intersection of all convex sets that contain A.
A pair (a, b), with a ∈ R n and b ∈ R defines a linear inequality a · x ≤ b. We say that a linear inequality (a, b) has non-negative coefficients when a ≥ 0. Any linear
A polyhedron in R n is a set that is the intersection of a finite number of closed half-spaces. A polytope in R n is a bounded polyhedron. Two special polytopes are the simplex in R n :
and the subsimplex
When n is understood, we use the notation ∆ and ∆ − .
2.2. The economy. An economy is a tuple Γ = (I, (Z i , u i , ω i ) i∈I ), where
• I is a finite set of agents;
In an economy Γ, L is the number of goods, and |I| = N is the number of agents.
Denote the set of goods by [L] = {1, . . . , L}.
An assignment in Γ is a vector
In an assignment x, we interpret x i,l as the amount of good l received by agent i.
Sometimes we interpret an assignment (x i,l ) as a matrix with a row for each agent and a column for each good. Let A denote the set of all assignments in Γ.
We restrict attention to economies in which
The consumption space can be restricted further, but we shall only do so explicitly using constraints.
The aggregate endowment in Γ is denoted byω = i∈I ω i .
2.3. Constraints. We introduce constraints through a primitive set C ⊆ A of assignments. The elements of C are termed the feasible allocations.
A constrained allocation problem with endowments is a pair (Γ, C) in which Γ = (I, (R L + , u i , ω i ) i∈I ) is an economy, C is a subset of the assignments in Γ, and (1) C is a nonempty polytope;
Examples:
(1) An exchange economy (the textbook model of general equilibrium) obtains when C is the set of all assignments x with i∈I x i,l ≤ω l for all l.
(2) Unit demand constraints: Suppose that l∈ [L] x i,l ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I and all x ∈ C.
(3) Allocation constraints: Suppose that i∈I x i,l =ω l for all l ∈ [L] and all x ∈ C.
(4) Floor constraints: fix subsets
The case when C consists of exactly the assignments that satisfy the unit demand and allocation constraints is important. We denote it by C HZ (when Γ is understood). Thus, given Γ,
x i,l ≤ 1 and i∈I x i,l =ω l )}.
The superscript HZ refers to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , who study the allocation problem assuming unit demand and allocation constraints. To guarantee that C HZ = ∅ we may assume, for example, that N = L andω l = 1; we discuss this model in detail in Section 4.
Floor constraints may be used to capture certain distributional constraints. For example one may want a certain minimum number of doctors to be assigned to rural areas, or a lower bound on the minorities that are assigned to a particular school, or that all students take at least two math courses.
2.4. Pre-processing of constraints. Define the lower contour set of C to be
Lemma 1. There exists a finite set Ω of linear inequalities with non-negative coefficients such that
and note that lcs
thus, since C is a polytope, D is finitely generated. Then by Theorem 19.1 in Rockafellar (1970) D is polyhedral, and therefore the intersection of finitely many halfspaces. Let Ω be the set of linear inequalities (a, b) defining this collection of halfspaces, so for each (a, b) ∈ Ω we have
Since for each i and l there is x ′ ∈ D with arbitrarily small x ′ i,l , we must have a ≥ 0. Hence Ω defines a finite collection of linear inequalities with non-negative coefficients.
To finish the proof, note that if
1 Lemma 1 is used by Balbuzanov (2019) to define a generalization of the probabilistic serial mechanism that accommodates constraints.
Given that C is nonempty, there are two types of inequalities (a, b) ∈ Ω: those with b = 0 and those with b > 0. If b = 0, then for any x ∈ C we must have
We can without loss assume that there is exactly one such constraint because if (a, 0), (a ′ , 0) ∈ Ω then these can be substituted for
, and if there is no constraint with b = 0 in Ω then we can include the trivial constraint (0, 0) in Ω. Let (a 0 , 0) ∈ Ω be this unique constraint.
Let Ω * = Ω \ {(a 0 , 0)} be the set of (a, b) ∈ Ω with b > 0.
Constraint (a 0 , 0), when non-trivial, forbids some agents from consuming certain goods: say that l is a forbidden good for agent i when a 0 i,l > 0. We use (a 0 , 0) to refine agents' consumption sets. Let X i be the set of vectors x i ∈ Z i such that
The rest of the constraints, the elements of Ω * , will be handled in a very different manner.
2.5. Individual rationality and Pareto optimality. A feasible allocation x ∈ C is acceptable to agent i if u i (x i ) ≥ u i (ω i ); x is individually rational (IR) if it is acceptable to all agents. We also define a notion of approximate individual rationality:
A feasible allocation x ∈ C is C-constrained Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no feasible allocation y ∈ C such that u i (y i ) ≥ u i (x i ) for all i with at least one strict inequality for one agent.
2.6. Equilibrium. For each c = (a, b) ∈ Ω * , we introduce a price p c . Given a price vector p = (p c ) c∈Ω * ∈ R Ω * , the personalized price vector faced by any agent i ∈ I is defined to be
Motivation. By way of motivation, we consider the case studied by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) : Consider a constrained allocation problem with endowments (Γ, C HZ ). Two notions of competitive equilibrium are natural:
• A Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium is a 1-slack equilibrium (x * , p * ) of (Γ, C HZ )
such that x * ∈ C HZ .
• A Walrasian equilibrium is a 0-slack equilibrium (x * , p * ) of (Γ, C HZ ) such
The following result is well-known (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) .
Proposition. There are economies in which all agents' utility functions are expected utility and that
(1) Have no Walrasian equilibria.
(2) Have (constrained) Pareto dominated Walrasian and HZ equilibria.
(3) For which there are constraints C ⊆ C HZ that no Walrasian or HZ equilibria satisfy.
Hylland and Zeckhauser prove the existence of a Pareto optimal HZ equilibrium, but the non-existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is problematic when we wish to maintain individual rationality.
Importantly, even when individual rationality is not a relevant objective (perhaps because endowments are controlled centrally), it is not possible to achieve additional constraints by means of HZ equilibrium. For example if we wish to ensure a minimum quota for certain schools in a district, or a geographical constraint on the allocation of doctors to hospitals, there is no way for HZ equilibrium to deal with such constraints.
Going beyond HZ-equilibrium, there are models of market design that use stability, or core-stability, as the criterion for design but where no stable outcomes that satisfy the constraint exist (Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2014; Kamada and Kojima, 2015) . One of the oldest example is the roomate problem: it is well known that there are in general no stable outcomes in the roomate problem. In contrast, we shall obtain as a simple corollary of our results that there are competitive equilibria in the market for roommates. Similarly, we are able to obtain equilibrium outcomes in many instances of allocation subject to constraints.
Main Result
Let (Γ, C) be a constrained allocation problem with endowments. Define Ω * and X i by pre-processing constraints as described in Section 2.4. Suppose, further, that
Our main result is then Theorem 2. Suppose that agents' utility functions are semi-strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotone. For any ε > 0, there is α ∈ (0, 1] and an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x * , p * ), such that x * is Pareto optimal and
In particular, x * is ε-individually rational.
Hylland-Zeckhauser with constraints
We turn to the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects fairly and subject to constraints. The objects are centrally owned (they could be schools, hospital positions, or courses), so all that matters about ω isω.
Assume a finite set O consisting of L indivisible goods. In particular, suppose that each good o ∈ O is available in fixed integer supply. Without loss of generality, we may assume that there is a single unit of each o. If there is more that one unit available, add as many copies of good o as needed. Suppose also that N = L.
The interpretation of an allocation x is that x i,o = 1 if and only if i obtains object o.
Fairness forces us to consider random allocations; these are represented by ma- (2) and (3), where x i,o is the probability that i obtains object o. It is generally impossible to be fair if only deterministic allocations are allowed. Random allocations have the added benefit that they reduce the model to an instance of the model we have considered in Section 2.
If A is the set of all random allocations, we fix some finite number of deterministic allocations and let C ⊆ A be our set of feasible allocations. In consequence, C is a nonempty polytope. Observe that C will satisfy all unit demand and allocative constraints in the economy Γ, as they are satisfied by any deterministic allocation.
Given such arbitrary C, a constrained HZ equilibrium is a 1-slack equilibrium
Corollary 1. Suppose that agents' utility functions are semi-strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotone. There exists a HZ equilibrium (x * , p * ) in which
(1) x * is C-constrained Pareto efficient; and
Observe that in an HZ equilibrium i x * i =ω, so that "demand equals supply," otherwise x * would not be constrained Pareto optimal. So there is no sense in which condition 2 of Corollary 1 allows for excess supply. If we had allowed for N < L
we would obtain a result along the lines of Corollary 1, with excess supply for some goods.
4.1. Constraint structures. In applications, C would be defined by writing down explicit constraints. We introduce the necessary formalism, which follows Budish, Che, Kojima, and Mi (2013) . A constraint is defined by a tuple (S, q S , q S ), where S ⊂ I × O is a subset of agent-object pairs, and (q S , q S ) is a pair of non-negative integers with q S < q S . The integers q S and q S are respectively called the floor quota and the ceiling quota.
So we require q S ≥ 1. Let q S = (q S , q S ).
An allocation x satisfies the constraint (S, q S , q S ) if
A constraint structure is a collection H of constraints. A constraint structure H defines a set of assignments
A singleton constraint (S, q S ) is such that S = {(i, o)} for some i ∈ I and o ∈ O, and q S = (0, 1). It means that i can obtain at most one copy of o. A row constraint (S, q S ) is such that S = {i} × O for some i ∈ I, and q S = (0, q i ). The meaning of a row constraint is that q i is the maximum amount of objects that agent
and q S = (0, q o ). Here the meaning is that q o is the total number of the copies of o available.
We assume that H contains the row constrains ({i} × O, (0, 1)) for all i and the column constraints (I × {o}, (0, 1)) for all o. These correspond to the unit demand and allocative constraints. Moreover, we assume that there exists x ∈ C with q S < (i,o)∈S x i,o < q S for all S ∈ H. When H satisfies these assumptions we say that it is allocative.
A constraint structure H is a hierarchy if, for every pair of S and S ′ in H, either
H is a bihierarchy if there exist two hierarchies
Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013) prove that if H is a bihierarchy then the elements of C can be written as convex combinations of deterministic allocations.
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This means that C is a nonempty polytope, and that it can be implemented by randomly selecting a deterministic allocation.
Corollary 2.
Suppose that H is allocative and a bihierarchy. If all agents' utilities are semi-strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotone, there exists a HZ equilibrium (x * , p * ) in which x * ∈ C and x * is C-constrained Pareto efficient.
Fairness.
Denote by H i the set of constraints that are either
• A row constraint for i;
• A singleton constraint involving agent i.
The constraints in H i involve exclusively agent i, and we can say whether a vector
Given an economy Γ, let X i denote the set of x i that satisfy the constraints in H i . Define C as the set of assignments x that satisfy the constraints in H * , by preprocessing we can then define Ω * and introduce price vectors (p c ) c∈Ω * and (p i ) i∈I as in Sections 2.4 and 2.6.
4.2.1. Equal-type no-envy. Two agents, i and j, are of equal type if X i = X j and, for
In consequence, agents of equal type face equal personalized price vectors.
An allocation x is equal-type envy-free if, for every two agents i, j of equal type,
Proposition 1. Every HZ equilibrium is equal-type envy-free.
The proposition follows because agents of equal type have the same consumption space and face identical prices.
4.2.2.
No envy with distributional constraints. Following Kamada and Kojima (2015, 2017b) , suppose that agents are doctors and objects are hospital positions. A distributional constraint takes the form
The set O ′ ⊆ O is the set of hospitals in a geographic region (a city or a prefecture).
Observe that a collection of distributional constraints is "anonymous" because each constraint does not distinguish among the identities of individual doctors. We use this property to ensure that all agents are of the same type, and thus obtain a stronger fairness conclusion than in Proposition 1.
A constraint structure H is anonymous if H i only contains the i-th row constraint and singleton constraints, and if H * only contains distributional constraints. Under anonymous constraints, all agents are of equal type. So every HZ equilibrium is envy-free.
Proposition 2. Under anonymous constraints, every HZ equilibrium is envy-free.
4.3.
A market for roommates. We turn to a market solution for the problem of forming partnerships. Consider the model of Section 4. Recall that we assumed N = L; now we interpret O as a copy of I, and think of o ∈ O as a different name for agent o ∈ I. If x is an assignment, interpret x i,j = 1 as agents i and j forming a partnership, or becoming roommates. When i is alone without a roommate, we have
In consequence, we restrict attention to assignments x where x i,j = x j,i , meaning that the matrix (x i,j ) i∈I,j∈I is symmetric.
Say that an assignment x is a matching if 1) x i,j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈ I × I, 2)
x is symmetric, 3) satisfies the unit demand constraints with equality ( j x i,j = 1) and 4) satisfies the allocation constraints with equality ( i x i,j = 1). Define C to be the convex hull of all matchings.
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It is instructive to work out the set of inequalities Ω * for this case. To this end, let F be the set of subsets F ⊆ I × I such that 1) for all i, (i, i) / ∈ F and (2) for every
For each F ∈ F , let G F be the graph with vertex set I and edge set {{i, j} : (i, j) ∈ F or (j, i) ∈ F }. Denote the cardinality of the maximum independent edge set of G F by k F . For every i ∈ I, let J i be the set of subsets J ⊂ ({i} × I) ∪ (I × {i}) such that (i, i) ∈ J and for every j = i, either (i, j) ∈ J or (j, i) ∈ J but not both. Then lcs(C) is characterized by the following inequalities.
Proposition 3.
Proof. Let D denote the set on the right-hand side of the proposition. We first prove that D ⊂ lcs(C). For every x ∈ D, consider the matrix x ′ obtained by letting
′ is symmetric and x ≤ x ′ . We prove that
otherwise let (j, i) ∈ F ′ . So G F ′ and G F have the same (undirected) edge set, and 4 Alternatively, we could define C to be all the symmetric assignments that satisfy the unit demand and allocation constraints, dropping the integrality constraint x i,j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus defined, the set C is a polytope: It is the convex hull of all matrices of the form (1/2)(P + P ′ ) where P is a permutation matrix with no even cycles greater than 2, see Katz (1970) . In consequence, our results apply. However, we cannot say that the equilibrium assignment can be implemented by randomizing a matching.
Similarly we can prove that for every i and every
Now define another matrix y by 1) for every (i, j) ∈ I × I with i = j, set
, and 2) for every i ∈ I, y i,
′ is symmetric and x ′ ∈ D, for every i and every J ∈ J i ,
So y ∈ D and it is a bistochastic matrix. Now we prove that y ∈ C. Edmonds (1965) proved that a symmetric bistochastic matrix z belongs to C if and only if for every r ∈ N and every I ′ ⊂ I with |I ′ | = 2r+1,
where F ⊂ I ′ × I ′ such that there does not exist (i, i) ∈ F and for every (i, j) ∈ I ′ × I ′ with i = j, either (i, j) ∈ F or (j, i) ∈ F but not both. For any such F , k F = r because I ′ is odd and we can form r pairs among the 2r elements of I ′ that can be paired. Since F ∈ F , then, y satisfies Edmonds' inequalities and thus y ∈ C. Since x ≤ x ′ ≤ y, x ∈ lcs(C).
To prove lcs(C) ⊂ D, consider any x ∈ C. Then x is the convex combination of deterministic matchings x k . For each ∅ = F ∈ F and each i, there is at most one j with x k i,j = 1. By the definition of independent edge set,
It is clear that x satisfies the other inequalities related to every J i . So x ∈ D. Then it means that lcs(C) ⊂ D.
An HZ equilibrium of the constrained allocation problem (Γ, C) implies a random matching x * (a probability distribution over matchings) that is Pareto efficient and corresponds to a market equilibrium.
Of course, x * needs not be stable in the game theoretic sense, but it corresponds to individual agents' optimizing behavior, as long as these agents take prices as given.
Price taking behavior is a plausible assumption in a large centrally-run market for partnerships, like for example a market for roommates in college dormitories.
A pseudo-market could be set up by the college, and equilibrium prices could in principle be enforced and be made transparent.
Example 1 (A market for roommates). Let I = {1, 2, 3} and L = 3. For agent i, consuming object l is the same as having agent l as her roomate. Suppose that the agents' utilities are With these preferences, there are no stable matchings. However, there is a HZ equilibrium. In the equilibrium, the price of the following constraint is two:
the price of the following constraint is one:
and the price of every other constraint is zero. Then, agent 1's personalized price vector is (0, 1, 2), 2's personalized price vector is (2, 0, 1), and 3's personalized price vector is (1, 2, 0). All of them choose the consumption (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and this is the symmetric HZ equilibrium allocation.
Walrasian equilibrium with unit demand constraints.
A third major application of Theorem 1 is to Walrasian equilibrium with unit demand constraints. In Section 2.7, we mentioned that Walrasian equilibrium may not exist in this model, even with very well behaved preferences.
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Consider an economy Γ = (I, (X i , u i , ω i ) i∈I ). We shall not consider any additional constraints, just the allocative and unit demand constraints. In fact, we can let X i = ∆ − and let x ∈ C if and only if i x i =ω. There will then be exactly L inequalities in Ω * , one for each good l, expressing that i x i,l ≤ω l .
In this model, for α ∈ [0, 1], an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium is a pair (x, p) such
2) x i maximizes i's utility within his α-modified budget:
Property 1 means that x is an allocation, or that demand equals supply and all markets clear. in which x is Pareto optimal. Moreover, given ε > 0 there is α ∈ (0, 1] and an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p) in which x is Pareto optimal and ε-individually rational.
It is possible to use the model in this section to obtain a kind of fairness property in the presence of endowments. Fairness, in the sense of absence of envy, is generally incompatible with individual rationality. Imagine an economy with two goods, where both agents prefer good 1 over good 2, and all the endowment of good 1 belongs to agent 1. Then, in any allocation, there will either be envy, or agent 1's individual rationality will be violated. So fairness has to be amended to account for the presence of endowment.
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In the present model of an economy with allocative and unit demand constraints, in any α-slack Walrasian equilibrium, if agent i envies agent j then it must be the case that i's endowment is worth more than j's at equilibrium prices. In a sense, this means that agents collectively value i's endowment more than j. Our next result formalizes this idea. z i ∈ ∆ − }} the set of satiated consumers, and by U = I \ S. Suppose that i∈U x i ≫ 0.
, and there exists welfare
then (x i ) i∈U solves the problem for v(0), and v(t) < v(0) for all t small enough.
The meaning of Theorem 3 is that if an agent i envies j then j's endowment is more valuable than i's in two senses. First, it is more valuable at equilibrium prices.
Second, the higher price valuation translates into a statement about how much agents value the endowment. In particular, j's endowment is more valuable than i's to a coalition of players U (a coalition that includes i!). It is more valuable to U in the sense that there are welfare weights for the members of U such that a change in 6 The paper by Echenique, Miralles, and Zhang (2019) deals exclusively with this problem, but proposes a very different solution.
agents' endowment towards having more of i's endowment and less of j's leads to a worse weighted utilitarian outcome. The results requires that i∈U x i ≫ 0 simply to ensure that when we subtract ω j we do not force some agent to consume negative quantities of some good.
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An important take-away from these results is that fairness and efficiency is compatible. Famously, in the standard model of school choice with priorities, these policy objectives are incompatible (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003)), and a lot of work has been devoted to understanding the resulting tradeoff between efficiency and fairness. As long as property rights may be implemented through endowments instead of priorities, our model provides a means to avoid a choice between the two policy objectives. It is worthy to note that a random assignment of bundles that looks feasible from an ex-ante view may not be implementable. For example, suppose there are three agents 1, 2, 3 and three objects a, b, c. Each object has one copy. The set of bundles is [L] = {ab, ac, bc}. The following random assignment is ex-ante feasible because it satisfies unit demand constraints of agents and capacity constraints of objects.
The i∈U x i ≫ 0 hypothesis in Theorem 3 is stronger than what we need. It suffices that if ω j,l > 0 then i∈U x i,l > 0. However, it is not implementable. The reason is that bundles are not independent "objects". When a bundle is assigned, the other two bundles become not available. Corollary 3 asserts the existence of Pareto optimal α-slack equilibria. This finding relies on the the following property: a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p) satisfies the cheapest-bundle property if, for each i, x i minimizes expenditure p · z i among all the z i ∈ ∆ − for which u i (z i ) = u i (x i ). The notion of a cheapest bundle, and its role in the first welfare theorem, was already established by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) .
Efficiency in α-slack
In Corollary 3, we impose semi-strictly quasiconcave utilities in order to ensure the existence of a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium with the cheapest-bundle property.
The first welfare theorem holds for such equilibria. Consider the allocations x = ((1, 0), (0, 1)) and y = ((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)). Note that x Pareto dominates y.
The following table summarizes how both x and y may be supported as Walrasian equilibria, both with α > 0 and α = 0. The first welfare theorem fails because agents have satiated preferences, not because we focus on equilibria with slack.
The table is hopefully obvious, but it may be useful to detail why y is an equilibrium allocation with α = 0. Note that income with prices (0, 1) is 1/2 for each agent.
Agent 1 is happy to spend his income purchasing x 1 = (1/2, 1/2) for a (global) utility maximum. Agent 2 spends all his income on good 2 and purchases a 1/2 share of good 2, but optimizes by also hitting his unit demand constraint and purchasing a 1/2 share of good 1.
The Hylland and Zeckhauser example.
A Walrasian equilibrium (a 0-slack equilibrium) may not exist in our model. We present a non-existence example originally due to Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , and we show how the symmetric Pareto optimal allocation in this example can be sustained as an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium with any α ∈ (0, 1] (Proposition 5).
Given is an economy with three agents and two schools, A and B. School B has two seats. We can model this as there being three schools: {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } with s 2 and s 3 being copies of school B each with a capacity of one. Agents have expected utilities given by the following vNM indexes: Proof. Let α ∈ (0, 1] and
Agents 1 and 2 can improve by purchasing more s 1 , but they cannot afford any more. They can only afford a 1/2 share in s 1 and buy 1/2 in s 2 for free. They can improve by purchasing more s 2 at the zero price, but that would not be feasible in ∆ − . Agent 3 is optimizing by choosing x 3 s 3 = 1 for a price of zero.
Note that in an equilibrium supporting x, the value of agents 1 and 2's endogenous income (p · ω i ) in equilibrium is 2α/(1 + 2α). So the value of the α-slack (the exogenous part of the budget) relative to the value of the endogenous p · ω i is 1 + 2α 2 → 1 2 as α → 0. While α shrinks to zero, the value of the exogenous income is not negligible. In the same spirit, the following proposition shows that the average endogenous budget will always be below the exogenous budget of one.
Proposition 6. If (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium with slack α ∈ (0, 1] then
. Sum over i to obtain:
Proposition 6 puts an upper bound on the average endogenous income. It cannot exceed the exogenous income of 1. In particular this means that the economy needs outside "money."
Finally, we consider the resolution presented in Le (2017) Then all agents have (with zero slack, or zero exogenous budget) an income of 101/2. The unique optimal bundle for agents 1 and 2 is x i = (1/2, 1/2, 0). Agent 3 is willing to spend all his income on buying the more expensive copy s 3 of good B, so x 3 = (0, 0, 1) is in his demand correspondence.
Consider a variation of the Hylland and Zeckhauser, with three agents and the same utility functions, but where endowments are ω 1 = (1/3, 1/2, 1/6), ω 2 =
(1/3, 1/6, 1/2), and ω 3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Then p = (100, 1, , 0), and x 3 = (0, 0, 1). Observe that agent 1 envies 2, despite having the same utility and the same endowment: 1/3 of school 1 and 2/3 of school 2, which happened to be split unequally over the two slots of school 2. More generally, two goods may be perfect substitutes but end up having different prices. This leads to envy among equals.
6.4. Examples. We present two simple explicit examples to illustrate how constraints can be priced.
Example 3. Consider an economy with 2 agents and 2 goods. In addition to the unit demand and allocation constraints, suppose that we want that
. In words, we have a minimum consumption requirement. We want all agents to consume at least δ units of each good.
Hence C consists of all assignments x = (x 1,1 , x 1,2 , x 2,1 , x 2,2 ) ∈ R
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+ with x i,1 +x i,2 ≤ 1 and x 1,l + x 2,l ≤ 1 for all i and l, such that x i,l ≥ δ.
Then we can let Ω * contain the inequalities It should be clear that lcs
Suppose that agents' endowments are ω i = (1/2, 1/2), i = 1, 2, and that utility is linear with u 1 (1, 0) = 10, u 1 (0, 1) = 1, while u 2 (1, 0) = 1 and u 2 (0, 1) = 10. So the agents would like to trade away from the equal endowments to the allocation (1, 0, 0, 1). There is then a (1 − 2δ)-slack equilibrium with p c 1,1 = p c 2,2 = 1 p c 1,2 = p c 2,1 = 1/10, p c 1 = p c 2 = 0. In this case the allocation is (1 − δ, δ, δ, 1 − δ).
Example 4. Consider three agents 1, 2, 3 and three objects A, B, C. Every object has one copy. Assume there are two constraints on deterministic allocations: A must be assigned to one of 1, 2, and C must be assigned to one of 1, 3. It is easy to see that C contains three feasible deterministic allocations: Table 1 . Feasible deterministic allocations Let C be the set of matrices λ 1 x 1 + λ 2 x 2 + λ 3 x 3 with λ i ∈ [0, 1] and
Clearly, every x ∈ C must satisfy the floor constraints:
However, the lower contour set lcs(C) can be characterized by following inequalities in addition to the usual bistochasticity conditions:
The last two inequalities essentially mean that x 2,C = 0 and x 3,A = 0. Thus, the consumption spaces of 2 and 3 are respectively For any endowments and any α ∈ [0, 1], x 3 could be an α-slack WE allocation with equilibrium prices p A = p B = p C = 1 and the prices of the first two inequality constraints above being zero.
Related Literature
Constrained resource allocation has received a lot of attention in recent years. Two early studies are Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2014) and Kamada and Kojima (2015) . Ehlers et. al focus on the problem of controlled school choice (which was introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) ), whereby school children have to be assigned seats at different schools to satisfy some diversity objective. 8 Kamada and Kojima are mainly (but not exclusively) motivated by the problem of allocating doctors to hospitals to satisfy geographic quotas. The objective of the quotas is to avoid an excessive concentration of doctors in urban areas. 9 Both papers proceed by adapting the notion of stability to capture the presence of constraints, and to add structure to the constraints being considered. Kamada and Kojima (2017b) elaborates further on the framework of Kamada and Kojima (2015) , with new notions of stability for matching with constraints. Controlled school choice is further investigated by, among others, Kominers and Sönmez (2013) , Westkamp (2013) , Aygun and Bó (2017) , and Nguyen and Vohra (2017) . Echenique and Yenmez (2015) and Kojima, Sun, and Yu (2018) consider the effects of constraints on schools, or firms, choice functions. Akbarpour and Nikzad (2017) looks at relaxing some constraints to make ex-ante fractional assignments easier to implement. Other than following a similar motivation, and serving as inspiration for our work, the research in these papers is methodologically quite different from ours.
Our paper can deal with the same kinds of constraints as in the school choice and hospital allocation literatures (as well as other applications studied in the literature, see Kamada and Kojima (2015) ), but we follow a different methodological tradition. Instead of a two-sided game-theoretic matching model, we consider object allocation and propose a competitive equilibrium solution. The aforementioned papers also investigate the role of incentives in their mechanisms. We expect our market mechanism to be incentive compatible in large markets, but have focused on existence, efficiency and fairness; there are no explicit results on incentives in the present write-up.
The recent work of Balbuzanov (2019) considers a version of the probabilistic serial mechanism for object allocation subject to constraint. Like us, he works on a one-sided object allocation model, but the focus on probabilistic serial makes the analysis clearly distinct from our work. We borrowed from this paper the idea, expressed in Lemma 1, allowing us to focus on non-negative linear inequalities.
The use of markets over lottery shares to solve centralized allocation problems was first proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) . They assume no constraints other than a unit demand restriction on agents' purchases. They impose a fixed income for each agent, independent of prices. Hylland and Zeckhauser make the point, which we elaborate on below, that a model with endowments would not work because equilibrium may not exist. They also emphasize that equilibrium may not be efficient, and introduce the "cheapest bundle" property that we employ as well in our version of the first welfare theorem. It should be clear that allowing for endowments is a stark departure from the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , and poses significant challenges. Many other papers have followed Hylland and Zeckhauser in analyzing competitive equilibria as solutions in market design. For example, Mas-Colell (1992) , Budish (2011), Ashlagi and Shi (2015) , He, Miralles, Pycia, Yan, et al. (2015) , He, Li, and Yan (2015) , Le (2017), and McLennan (2018) . None of these papers consider the problem of using market to solve the constrained allocation problem.
Of these, the work that is closest to ours are Mas-Colell (1992) , Le (2017) , and
McLennan (2018) because, like us, they propose to avoid the non-existence of Walrasian equilibria by means of a hybrid income between the exogenous budget in
Hylland-Zeckhauser, and the endogenous Walrasian income. A version of the hybrid model was first introduced by Mas-Colell (1992) , who presents an existence result that is similar to ours, with income that is a hybrid of a fixed price-independent income, and income that depends on prices. His result requires the first component to be determined as part of the fixed point argument in the equilibrium existence result. Aside from the presence of constraints, our result differs from his by allowing us to obtain approximate individual rationality with a small exogenous α.
In Le's notion of equilibrium, two identical goods may have different prices. As a consequence, there may be envy among identical agents, and it may be necessary for some agents to purchase a more expensive copy of a good when a cheaper one is available. Envy among equals is problematic for normative reasons. 10 Having agents purchase the more expensive copy of an identical good is problematic because it may make it hard to implement Le's equilibria in a decentralized fashion. These issues are illustrated through a specific example in Section 6.3. A second, somewhat more technical, issue is that the exact way in which the exogenous and endogenous budgets are combined is different in Mas-Colell's and Le's cases from ours. These authors add them, while we mix them. This may seem like a technicality, but it matters because, for example, Le can only totally eliminate excess demand when all agents are endowed with all goods (all endowments are full support), and may have 10 One could interpret different prices for different copies of the same good as a novel endogenous transfer scheme, but we are unaware of a normative defense of this idea.
to endure some excess demand when that is not the case. Finally, in Le's result, the efficiency property of equilibrium is weaker: weak Pareto optimality, rather than Pareto optimality.
The third relevant paper is the recent work of McLennan (2018), who presents an existence result for equilibrium with "slack" in a general model. McLennan's general model of an economy allows for production, and encompasses our model as a special case, but his notion of equilibrium with slack differs from ours in important ways.
Agents in his (and our) model may be satiated, and his notion of slack controls the distribution of transfers from satiated agents to unsatiated agents. Satiated agents may spend less than their income, and it is important to transfer their unspent income to unsatiated agents. In contrast, our α parameter controls the role of endowments, allowing for α to specify the weight of equal incomes vs. (unequal) endowments. In fact, it is possible to construct an example to illustrate the difference between the two notions of equilibrium: in the example, no agents are satiated, so the slack in McLennan's notion of equilibrium has no role to play, and his equilibrium allocations are independent of α; in contrast, our equilibrium allocations for this example range from equal division to the autartical consumption of endowments, as α ranges from placing all weight on the exogenous income, to placing all weight on initial endowments. (We are grateful to Andy McLennan for this example, which can be found in his paper.) Kojima, Sun, and Yu (2018) and Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang (2019) consider market equilibrium in economies with constraint, like we do. The paper by Kojima et. al characterize the constraints that preserve the gross substitutes property of firms' demands, in a model with quasilinear utility for firms. Gross substitutes ensure equilibrium existence. Gul, Pesendorfer, and Zhang (2019) introduce constraints in a model in which agents have quasilinear utility and a budget; then, equilibrium in a non-quasi linear model is obtained by taking a limit of economies in which agents care less and less about the consumption of money. Both of these papers introduce restrictions on the class of constraints that can be considered; roughly speaking, these are restrictions that result in demand functions having the gross substitutes property. Our methods are different, and our notion of equilibrium with prices for constraints is different from their solution concepts.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove the theorem by assuming that all utility functions are semi-strictly quasi-concave. We then explain the differences when utility functions are only quasiconcave.
With an abuse of notation, we write l∈ [L] 
We define a price ceilinḡ
, and a price space
Given α ∈ (0, 1], for every p ∈ P, define
means we are done because it implies that all bundles in d i (p) cost the same at
since X i is convex, εz i + (1 − ε)x i ∈ X i . By the semi-strict quasi-concavity of u i ,
. This means that, for any ε ∈ (0, 1),
But this is only possible, for arbitrarily small ε,
Proof. Let x i ∈ d i (p). Then for any z i ∈ X i with p i ·z i < p i ·x i , we have z i ∈ B i (p, α).
and therefore
The converse set inclusion follows similarly because if x i is not in the right-hand set, there would exist z i ∈ X i with p i · z i < p i · x i and u i (z i ) = v i , which is not possible as such z i would be in B i (p, α).
, then this strict inequality will be true for p n with n large enough; a contradiction, as u i is continuous. If
for the case of a strict inequality then applies.
Remark 1. Lemma 4 uses crucially that α > 0.
Proof. To prove upper hemi-continuity, we shall prove that d i has a closed graph.
First, consider the case where V i (p) < v i . By the maximum theorem, V i is continuous, so V i (p n ) < v i for all large enough n. Then Lemma 2 implies that
Second, consider the case where
Then for all n large enough,
is upper hemicontinous, by the maximum theorem. So
which is a contradiction.
It is easy to see that d i (p) is nonempty, compact-and convex-valued. So d i (p) is also nonempty, compact-and convex-valued. For every c ∈ Ω * , define the aggregate demand on c by
Define the aggregate demand correspondence by
and the excess demand correspondence by
Consider the correspondence ϕ : P → P defined by
D(p), and therefore z(p), are upper hemicontinuous, convex-valued, and compactvalued. Thus, ϕ is upper hemi-continuous, convex-valued and compact-valued. By
Kakutani's fixed point theorem, there exists p * ∈ P with p * ∈ ϕ(p * ).
Note that there exists z * ∈ z(p * ) such that
We shall prove that (x * , p * ) is an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium. On the other hand, if we let x ∈B i (p, 0), then γx ∈B i (p, α), where
Since γ ≤ 1, γ ∈ X i .
Note that
x − γx = |1 − γ| x < δ.
Thus inf{ x − y : y ∈B i (p, α)} < δ, and therefore sup{inf{ x − y : y ∈B i (p, α)}, x ∈B i (p, 0)} < δ. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Let u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for all i. Then
Sum over i to obtain:
Thus y cannot be an allocation.
In second place, suppose that (x, p) is an α-slack Walrasian equilibrium in which each x i satisfies the cheapest-bundle property. Then, for any y i ∈ ∆ − , u i (y i ) ≥ u i (x i ) implies that p · y i ≥ p · x i , while u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) implies that p · y i > p · x i . Thus, if (y i ) i∈ [N ] Pareto dominates x, adding up gives p · i y i > p · x i = p ·ω, as x is an allocation. Then (y i ) i∈ [N ] cannot be an allocation.
Proof of Theorem 3
Our first observation establishes the relation between envy and the value of endowments at equilibrium prices.
Lemma 9. Let (x, p) be a Walrasian equilibrium with slack α ∈ (0, 1]. If i envies j, then p · (x j − x i ) > 0 and p · (ω j − ω i ) > 0.
Proof. Let i envy j, so u i (x j ) > u i (x i ). Then utility maximization implies that
where the strict inequality follows because x j ∈ ∆ − . So p · (x j − x i ) > 0 and
Now consider a α-slack Walrasian equilibrium (x, p). Agent i's maximization problem is:
Where I i = α + (1 − α)p · ω i , λ i is a multiplier for the budget constraint, and γ i for the l x i,l ≤ 1 constraint.
Utility functions are C 1 . The first-order conditions for the maximization problems are then:
where ∂ l u i (x i ) denotes the partial derivative of u i with respect to x i,l .
Observe that if p · x i < α + (1 − α)p · ω i , then the budget constraint is not binding and λ i = 0. As a consequence, u i (x i ) = max{u i (z i ) : z i ∈ ∆ − }. Let S = {i ∈ [N] : p · x i < α + (1 − α)p · ω i } be the set of satiated consumers. Let U = {i ∈ [N] : p · x i = α + (1 − α)p · ω i } be the set of unsatiated, and observe that we can let λ i > 0 for all i ∈ U. Consider the two stage social program:
Stage 1:
Stage 2: maxỹ ∈(∆ − ) U i∈U 1 λ i u i (ỹ i ) i∈Uỹ i ≤ω − i∈S x i Note that (x i ) i∈S solves Stage 1, while satisfying i∈S x i ≤w, and that given (x i ) i∈S , (x i ) i∈U solves Stage 2. That this is so follows from the fact that (x i ) i∈U solves the first-order conditions for the Stage 2 problem with Lagrange multiplier p for the constraint that i∈Uỹ i ≤ω − i / ∈S x i . Now use the assumption that i∈U x i ≫ 0. This means that there existst > 0 such that if t ∈ (0,t] then the set ofỹ ∈ (∆ − ) U such that i∈Uỹ i ≤ω + t(ω i − ω j ) − i / ∈S x i is nonempty (and, for constraint qualification, contains an element that satisfies all constraints with slack).
Consider the problem maxỹ ∈(∆ U − ) i∈U
i∈Uỹ i ≤ω + t(ω i − ω j ) − i∈S x i Note that for each t ∈ (0,t] there exists (ν(t), γ(t), α(t)) such that v(t) = sup{ Here ν(t) is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that i∈Uỹ i ≤ω − i∈S x i + t(ω i − ω j ), while γ(t) and α(t) are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraint that (ỹ i ) ∈ (∆ − ) N . Choose a selection (ν(t), γ(t), α(t)) such that ν(0) = p.
Letω =ω − i∈S x i . The saddle point inequalities imply that
Now recall that ν(0) = p. Then Lemma 9, together with the above inequality, imply that
for all t ′ > 0 with t ′ ≤t.
